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                                                     Abstract
We offer evidence in this paper that US interest rate policy has an important 
influence in the determination of credit spreads on emerging market bonds over US 
benchmark treasuries, and therefore on their cost of capital. Our analysis improves upon 
the existing literature and understanding, by addressing the dynamics of market 
expectations in shaping views on interest rate and monetary policy changes, and by 
recognizing non-linearities in the link between US interest rates and emerging market 
bond spreads, as the level of interest rates affects the market's perceived probability of 
default and the solvency of emerging market borrowers. For a country with a moderate 
level of debt, repayment prospects would remain good in the face of an increase in US 
interest rates, so there would be little increase in spreads. A country close to the 
borderline of solvency would face a steeper increase in the spreads. Simulations of a 200 
basis points (bps) increase in US short-term interest rates (ignoring any change in the US 
10 year  Treasury rate) show an increase in emerging market spreads ranging from 6 bps 
to 65 bps, depending on debt/GDP ratios. 
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I. Introduction
How interest rate policies in major industrial countries affect the pricing of 
emerging market debt remains an unresolved issue. Despite its very important policy and 
practical implications, our understanding of this link is shaped more by episodic evidence 
--in 1991, 1994, and 2003 when sharp swings in emerging market spreads coincided with 
a cyclical shift in the stance of US  monetary policy --than by rigorous research and 
robust empirical findings. One point of view, popularized by the financial press, 
emphasizes the role of investors’ risk tolerance or risk appetite, even though such factors 
are likely driven by a host of global macroeconomic conditions and uncertainties, 
including potentially the pace of changes in US interest rates, and are more directly 
relevant to the equity market than fixed income bond markets. And, while considerable 
literature exists on the determinants of emerging market debt spreads over US treasury 
securities, that literature is disappointingly inconclusive concerning the effects of the 
global interest rate environment. For instance, Arora and Cerisola (2000), Min et al. 
(2003) and Ferrucci et al. (2004) find that the level of US interest rates plays a 
considerable role in the determination of EM bond spreads--spreads widen as US rates go 
up--but Kamin and von Kleist (1999) argue that there is little explanatory power of 
industrial country short-term interest rates, once one controls for credit quality. 
Eichengreen and Mody (2000), in contrast with all of the above, find that syndicated bank 
loans to EM countries tend to respond positively to increases in US interest rates, and the 
spread on those loans responds negatively—though this surprising result is very sensitive 
to regional differences.  Furthermore, studies focusing on the US corporate bond market 
have also found a negative relationship between credit spreads and US Treasury yields 4
(Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; Duffee, 1996, and 1998; Colin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and 
Martin, 2001)
7, as predicted by structural models of credit risk following Merton (1974).
Existing studies of the link between US interest rates and EM bond market 
spreads have several weaknesses.  One major shortcoming is the scant attention paid to 
the dynamics of market expectations in shaping views on interest rate and monetary 
policy changes, and how such policy changes are factored into the determination of bond 
market prices and yields
8.  The hypothesis advanced here is that the market anticipates 
the future behavior of the Fed by observing the evolution of relevant leading short-term 
macroeconomic indicators and factors in such expectations well in advance of actual 
changes in interest rates.  This dynamic induces an important correlation between EM 
bond spreads and key indicators of the US economic outlook such as the US non-farm 
payrolls report and retail sales, as is clearly demonstrated by recent experience--much of 
the market reaction regarding the EM bond spreads occurred in April/May 2004, when 
the reported payroll figures indicated stronger growth momentum than anticipated by the 
market
9.  The reason for this dynamic is the particular institutional setting of interest rates 
in the US, where under the prevailing regime (which in many ways is equivalent to 
inflation targeting, without an explicit target), the market comes to form views about Fed 
                                                
7 Also studies  by Leake (2003), and Boss and Scheicher (2002) focusing respectively  on the UK and 
Euro-corporate bond markets, find  a small negative relationship between credit spreads on sterling 
investment-grade corporate bonds and the level and slope of the term structure of UK interest rates.
8 Arora and Cerisola (2000) however look at the predictability of US monetary policy, and find that 
heightened uncertainty about that policy leads to a widening of spreads.
9  As Uribe and Yue (2003) note, US interest rates also help to drive business cycles in EM economies, and 
spreads respond to EM activity.  However, their empirical results show that US interest rate shocks affect 
domestic EM variables mostly through their effects on country spreads.5
behavior, based on the evolution of certain leading short-term economic indicators, such 
as payroll figures, retail sales, and core inflation data
10.
A second weakness of the existing literature is the lack of attention paid to the 
non-linearity in the relationship between US interest rates and EM spreads.  Indeed, the 
spread incorporates a default probability in a non-linear way, and the effect of higher 
world interest rates itself affects the default probability non-linearly.  For instance, at low 
rates of interest and in periods of favorable economic activity and low debt in developing 
countries, a rise in US interest rates may have little effect on investors’ estimates of the 
probability of repaying—and indeed, on the objective likelihood of that repayment.  In 
contrast, when the EM borrower is at the borderline of its ability to repay, a given 
increase in US rates may push the borrower over the edge, sharply increasing the 
probability of default.  Such a scenario may have occurred, for instance, in 1982 and 
1994.
A further aspect of that non-linearity is that sharp shifts of expectations of default 
probabilities may be self-fulfilling, and correspond to jumps between multiple equilibria.  
Indeed, those expectations can be rational because higher interest rates will increase the 
likelihood that countries cannot meet their debt service obligations.  While models with 
sunspot equilibria are sometimes criticized as just adding an extra indeterminacy because 
what triggers the jumps between equilibria is not explained, in international capital 
markets, that role may be assumed by global liquidity conditions and the “appetite for 
risk.”  In our estimation, we divide the sample into crisis and non-crisis periods.  We also
                                                
10 This accords with the view and assessment of key market practitioners.  A credit market strategist was 
quoted by Credit (2004) as saying, “it is not the rate hikes that matter, but what is happening to the 
economy”.6
include proxies for international liquidity and for contagion in financial markets.  Indeed, 
given that there are investors in EM bonds that are common across countries, it is natural 
to expect that a crisis in one country should be associated with higher spreads in other 
markets, if they both are the result of a changed attitude to risk or liquidity.
A third improvement relative to the current literature is our use of more recent 
data (until June, 2004)—and longer time series; this may help to distinguish between 
hypotheses.  In particular, we use monthly data for individual country  Emerging Market 
Bond Index Plus (EMBI
+) spreads, available from JP Morgan which is a major dealer in 
emerging bond markets, and extending back for some countries to 1991.  The bonds are 
issued in US dollars, so that spreads reflect credit risk—the probability that the borrower 
will not repay.  The set of countries includes all the major sovereign borrowers, and the 
data are based on trading in secondary markets of Brady bonds and Eurodollar issues.  
Our sample includes the following 17 countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, 
South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela.  We estimate an unbalanced panel, with 
data availability varying from country to country.  While the data on spreads are based on 
secondary market data, they provide many more data points and allow a finer 
appreciation of the effects of interest rate increases than primary market data.   Moreover 
with transaction volumes in secondary markets surpassing those in primary markets by 
several fold, spreads based on secondary market prices are more informative and less 
contaminated by supply effects than the spreads for new issues.7
II. A Framework for Analysis
Our approach to understanding the link between US interest rates and emerging 
market debt spreads focuses on the impact of interest rates on  the market’s perceived  
probability of default. The starting point here is the simple relationship between the 
probability of default p on EM bonds and the rate of interest on riskless securities, say US 
treasuries, paying rate, r (see, for instance, Arora and Cerisola, 2000).  If the default is 
complete (with no repayment of either principal or interest
11) , investors are risk neutral,  
and assuming away the possibility of default  correlation across  borrowers, then the 
interest rate i on EM bonds should yield the same expected return as US treasuries, so
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11 In studies where default is taken to be less than complete, the rate of recovery upon default is generally 
assumed to be constant (see for instance, Elton et al. 2001).A constant recovery rate does not change our 
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We go behind this simple relationship to look at the determinants of the 
ability to service the debt
12, while leaving aside issues of voluntary default.  Suppose that 
the EM sovereign borrower has a stochastic income stream Y, and that it defaults when 
that income is less than the debt service.  Then the probability of default will be given by
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We will further assume for concreteness that Y is determined by a first order 
autoregression      1 Y Y  with innovations that are i.i.d. with distribution function F().  
Let  1    Y rD Z   be the interest burden at a zero default probability minus expected 
income.  Then the probability of default can be written
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It is important to note three things about the above equation: i) the probability 
depends on the stock of debt, as well as lagged income; ii) equation (4) is highly non-
linear in the default probability; and iii) it can have multiple solutions, since, in general, 
the right hand side is increasing in the default probability
13.  Figure 1 shows the case 
where there are 3 intersections of the 45 degree line (the LHS of eq. 4) and the RHS of 
the equation. 
                                                
12 A seminal article is Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).
13 See Jeanne (1997).910
Figure 1.  Multiple Solutions for Default Probabilities
p
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The intuition is clear: by expecting a default, investors can make a default more 
likely.  However, this is only true in certain ranges for the variables and the parameters.  
The “fundamental” variable Z needs to be in a certain range, and, in particular, debt D
has to be large enough that increases in interest costs can make debt service painful for 
the EM borrower.  A necessary condition for three solutions is that the cumulative 
distribution function should have a slope greater than unity at some point—in particular, 
at the middle intersection. Since the slope of this curve is simply the probability density 
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at the middle intersection point.  
What is the effect of increasing the US interest rate on the probability of default?  
Increasing the US rate shifts up the curve that corresponds to the RHS of (4): it increases 
F[Z+(1+r)pD/(1-p)]11
the value of p corresponding to the leftmost and the rightmost intersections—that is, 
increases the default probabilities.  It has the opposite effect on the middle intersection, 
but, as in most models, that intersection is unstable, so it can be ignored.  In addition to 
increasing the value of p at the intersection points, it may also eliminate the two leftmost 
intersections, leaving only the third one, with the highest probability of default.  Thus, if 
it shifts the curve up enough it may have a dramatic effect on the (rationally expected) 
occurrence of default, since the upper equilibrium makes a default very likely.














We see that, since dp/dr>0, both terms on the right hand side of (6) are positive, so that 
increases in US rates increase the spread.  In addition to the non-linearity embodied in 
dp/dr, the derivative dlogS/dr is also highly non-linear in p.  A given change in the 
probability of default dp/dr will have a larger effect on the spread when probabilities of 
default are either very low or high than when they are close to one-half.
The implications of the above for developing a more rigorous  estimation  
methodology are two-fold.  First, it is not sufficient just to include the US interest rate in 
a linear regression explaining the spread.  The effect on the spread is non-linear, and 
depends on other variables.  The time series of correlations of EMBI spreads with US 
interest rates (measured over 36 month rolling periods between December 1992 and June 
2004 ) show a great deal of fluctuation, with a clear break between crisis and non-crisis 
periods (Figures 2 and 3).Thus interacting US interest rate variables with variables which 12
capture the severity of the debt problem may be essential to capturing the effect of global 
monetary conditions on EM spreads.
Figure 2. Correlation of EMBI and US interest rates rolling three-year































Figure 3 Correlation of EMBI and US interest rates rolling









































Second, the possibility of multiple equilibria should be taken into account.  We 
see this possibility as being related to changes in global liquidity conditions and the 
appetite for risk, and hence we introduce variables that attempt to capture those features 
in regressions explaining the spreads.  In addition, it may well be the case that the effect 13
of explanatory variables on the spreads is different, depending on which equilibrium is 
chosen.  Thus, it may make sense to divide the sample into two sub-samples: “normal” 
times, and “crisis” periods when a particular country faces sharply higher spreads as a 
result of a debt default or currency attack.  For instance, it seems plausible that if a 
country is in crisis, then the effect of world monetary conditions on the spread will be 
less significant.  It is likely that the country can emerge from crisis and reduce the very 
high interest rates that it faces mainly by its own actions—unless the crisis was provoked 
by a shift in global risk appetite (see next paragraph).  In normal times, however, 
countries’ spreads may be very sensitive to the conditions in global capital markets, 
especially if they are in a middle region of high but not overwhelming debt. Dividing the 
sample would prevent outliers from distorting estimates of the influence of “push” 
factors.  The occurrences of very high spreads in our sample are mostly associated with 
defaults or currency crises on the part of the borrowing country: Mexico in December 
1994, Russia in August 1998, and Argentina in February 2002, for instance.  
Moreover, the existence of multiple equilibria gives a natural role to contagion 
effects in international capital markets
14. Again, this contagion may operate through a 
change in global risk appetite, and in our model, be signaled by changes in the spread 
between US corporate borrowers with high and low risk.  It may also be evidenced by a 
positive effect of the spread in non-crisis countries of a dummy variable that counts the 
number of other countries in the crisis state.  This could be expected to operate if the 
                                                
14 For a discussion of the relationship between multiple equilibria and contagion, see Masson (1999; 2001).  
A contrary view of the relevance of multiple equilibria in financial markets is presented by Morris and Shin 
(1998; 2002).  However, their argument relies on the iterated elimination of all dominated strategies (with 
infinite iteration), which experimental evidence suggests does not apply in real world situations (Camerer, 
1997).14
country itself is not in crisis; for the same reason as above, once a country is in the crisis 
state it is mainly affected by its own variables—or, if the crisis was caused by a loss of 
risk appetite, by an abatement of contagion and a return to more normal conditions.
III. Empirical Methodology
As in much of the empirical literature, we use panel regressions of the EM interest 
rate spread over US treasuries on domestic determinants of a country’s credit-worthiness 
as well as global variables that explain the supply and cost of credit to emerging markets.  
Ferrucci et al. (2004) call the first set of variables “pull factors”, and the second, “push 
factors”; their research concludes that both sets are important in explaining EM spreads.  
However, as the discussion above suggests, it is difficult to separate the two sets of 
variables conceptually.  For instance, the level of US interest rates influences a country’s 
creditworthiness since borrowing that is sustainable in a low world interest rate 
environment (whatever the country’s economic fundamentals) may not be so when 
interest rates are high.  
We follow Ferrucci et al. (2004) in distinguishing between long run influences on 
spreads, which are constrained to have the same coefficients for all countries, with the 
short run dynamics that can vary from country to country and may include other 
explanatory variables.  The short-run dynamics are specified to take the form of an error 
correction model, where the errors are deviations from the long-run equilibrium 
relationship.  
The econometrics behind this model in a panel context are described in Pesaran, 
Shin, and Smith (1999). The model is estimated using their Pooled Mean Group 
Estimator.  In particular, we posit a long run relationship linking the log of spreads of EM 15
interest rates over comparable US treasuries, to US interest rates, the spread between high 
and low risk US corporate bonds, and various variables reflecting the borrower’s 
creditworthiness (trade openness, debt/income, the ratio of short-term debt in the total, 
and reserves/debt). If we call all these right hand side variables the vector X, then the 
long-run relationship is 
(7)
where the intercept term may vary across countries, allowing for fixed effects, while the 
slope coefficients are constrained to be the same. The dynamic equations take the form 
error-correction models for which the short-run adjustment toward the same long-run 
relationship can vary across countries:  
(8)
The vector Y may include first differences of all or a subset of the X variables, plus 
other variables that influence the short run dynamics but not the long-term equilibrium 
level of spreads. In the latter category we include current changes in US monetary policy 
variables and forecasts of their future evolution (to be described below).
Note that the estimation of (8) is not straightforward using panel estimation 
programs, because of the non-linear constraints on the long run coefficients. In particular, 
if we estimate 
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(9), 
then we need to impose the following constraints 
(10).
Estimation can be done in two stages, that is, first estimate the long term 
regression, (7), and then use the lagged residuals to replace the term in square brackets in 
(8). We use the two-stage approach for our exploratory regressions that aim to narrow 
down the set of explanatory variables.  However, this method is inefficient since it 
ignores the effect of short-term dynamics when estimating the long-term coefficients β. 
Therefore, the PMG estimates impose long-run coefficients in the context of a dynamic 
panel regression.
When considering variables that may influence short-run dynamics, we include 
changes in the above long-run determinants and also forecasts of the change in stance of 
US monetary policy.  Thus we first estimate forecasting equations for US interest rates 
that include as explanatory variables lagged changes in US capacity utilization, retail 
sales, the producer price index, and M2 data.  Then we test whether these forecasts have 
an additional effect, over and above the long run relationship between US interest rates 
and EM spreads and the contemporaneous change in US rates.
In order to maximize the number of observations, and focus on the 
macroeconomic determinants of US monetary policy, we estimate the model at a monthly 
frequency, even if this limits the availability of country-specific determinants of EM 









ij , ,  17
reserves and the money supply are available monthly, while quarterly or annual data are 
available for GDP and foreign debt.  We interpolate the latter variables where necessary.  
In specifying the effects of US monetary policy, we include in the long-run 
relationship the levels of US short rates (the US Treasury bill rate
15), the 10-year 
Treasury bond rate, and the interest rate spread between high and low risk US corporate 
bonds.  The latter variables, as well as being influenced by US monetary policy, may also 
capture global risk appetite.  We interact the US T Bill rate with the country’s debt to 
GNI ratio, since as discussed in section II, non-linearities are likely to be important.  
We have argued that it is important to divide the sample into crisis and non-crisis 
periods.  A country i is in a non-crisis period t if in that period it is not suffering a crisis, 
even if other countries are.  But it is also possible that the existence of crises at t in other 
countries—and their number—may increase the interest rate for country i.  A significant 
coefficient on the number of other countries in crisis may be evidence of contagion 
effects, since, if positive, it would come over and above the country’s own fundamentals 
and global monetary conditions.
16
Dating of crisis periods is not straightforward, however.  One approach is to let 
the data on exchange market pressure (the sum of exchange rate changes and reserve 
changes, appropriately weighted) identify crisis periods.  A recent application is 
Kaminsky (2003), and we use the crisis dates she identifies (Kaminsky, 2003, table 2), 
but instead of assuming that the duration of each crisis is 24 months, we use a much 
smaller window, six months following the crisis date in her list—except for Argentina.  
                                                
15Arora and Cerisola (2000) suggest that the federal funds rate is more appropriate, but we find the TB rate 
to be a better explanatory variable of EM spreads. 18
In practice, the period of very high spreads has been limited to a few months, when a 
resolution has been in sight.  Argentina’s 2002 default is an exception, and we make the 
crisis dummy continue to the end of our sample.  We also add the Russian crisis, starting 
in August 1998, since Russia is not in her sample.
IV. Estimation Results
We first describe the long-run (static) regressions of the log of spreads on both 
push and pull factors.  Of especial interest is the relative importance of the two sets, and 
evidence of non-linearity in the relationship.  Table 1 gives the coefficient estimates, with 
the sample divided into crisis and non-crisis periods, with the latter dominating in our 
sample (1497 months versus only 54 crisis periods
17).  
Country specific variables seem to dominate US interest rates in influence over 
EM spreads.  In particular, trade openness has a strong negative effect on spreads, which 
is plausible since more open countries are better able to adjust their balance of payments 
in order to generate earnings to service external debt; this variable may also reflect the 
finding in the growth literature that more open countries tend to grow faster.  As 
expected, the level of debt to a country’s income has a significant positive influence on 
the spread it faces, while the reserves/debt ratio and the proportion of short-term debt 
both have a significant negative influence.  The latter effect may simply reflect an 
upward-sloping term structure.  
                                                                                                                                                
16 Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) find that the occurrence of crises elsewhere tends to increase a 
country’s likelihood to experience a crisis.
17 As noted above, our choice of a small crisis window (6 months) limits the number of crisis periods. In 
addition, our reliance on Kaminsky (2003) for the crisis dates no doubt misses some crises, since not all the 
countries in our sample are on her list.19
Turning to the US interest rate variables, in non-crisis periods the US short-term 
rate, entered linearly, did not have a significant coefficient (not reported), while the long-
term interest rate (reported here) has a negative, but insignificant, coefficient.  These 
results contrast with those of Ferrucci et al. (2004).  However, the interest rate spread on 
high-risk versus low-risk US corporate borrowers comes in very strongly in non-crisis 
periods.
As we have argued above, the effect of US rates can be expected to be non-linear, 
and the US treasury bill rate interacted with the borrowing country’s debt/gni ratio does 
in fact enter significantly in non-crisis periods (column 3) and produces significantly 
higher explanatory power than the interest rate entered alone.  Thus, the impact of rising 
US rates is higher, the higher is a country’s level of indebtedness.  In non-crisis periods, 
countries are also vulnerable to crises in other countries, as the contagion dummy (the 
number of crises elsewhere) has a significant positive effect.
The relationship between global monetary conditions and the EM spread is quite 
different during periods of crisis, as we can see from column 2 of the table.  A chi-square 
test rejects equality of the two sets of coefficients.  In crisis periods the US Hi-low spread 
and the US Tbill rate interacted with a country’s debt have no significant effect, as is also 
the case for the US long rate (which was already true in non-crisis periods).  In contrast, 
all the “pull” factors except trade openness continue to have a significant influence on 
EM spreads in the expected direction.  Somewhat surprisingly, the contagion dummy 
(that is, the number of other countries in crisis) has no longer a positive effect on 
spreads—it is the reverse; conditioned on a country being in crisis, its spreads do not 
suffer from other countries also being in crisis.  Of course, the fact of being in a crisis 20
situation may itself depend on the contagion dummy.  It is also true that the constant term 
is significantly higher in column 2 than in column 3.  In sum, it seems that interest rates 
charged to crisis countries are more dependent on their own behavior than on conditions 
on global capital markets.  
When the crisis and non-crisis periods are pooled (column 1), not surprisingly the 
estimates resemble those of column 3, given the preponderance of non-crisis 
observations.  However, the contagion dummy is now insignificant, and the explained 
variance is lower than for either sub sample.  Since equality of the two sets of coefficients 
in the sub-samples is rejected, the usual procedure of estimating a combined sample of 
crisis and non-crisis observations on spreads is not legitimate.
We then turn to the dynamic equations, which we estimate first by using the 
residual from the long-run equations, in particular a somewhat more parsimonious model 
reported in Table 1, column 4.  The PMG technique is later used to estimate 
unconstrained short run dynamics and a common long run relationship, but our initial 
estimates, reported in Table 3, also constrain the short run dynamics to be the same.  The 
common short-run dynamics then give some idea of the average effect on spreads across 
the set of EM countries.
Of particular interest to us is to see whether the forecasted stance of US monetary 
policy, and not just current interest rate variables, helps explain the evolution of EM 
spreads.  Therefore, we first attempt to relate our US interest rate variables—the T Bill 
rate, the 10-year Treasury rate, and the interest rate spread between high and low risk 
corporate borrowers—to indicators of inflationary pressures and the strength of US 
economic activity.  These are presented in Table 2, where 3 lags of each of the 21
explanatory variables are included in each case.  Changes in the latter variables are often 
cited by “Fed watchers” as leading indicators of changes in Fed policy.
The three interest rate variables are affected differently by movements in these 
indicators.  The T Bill rate seems to respond significantly, and positively, to upticks in 
retail sales and capacity utilization, while evidence of a significant effect of producer 
prices and M2 is weaker.  Indeed, the latter variable is negative, so that a liquidity effect 
of monetary expansion may operate.  Long-term bonds also respond positively to retail 
sales, while the first lag of M2 expansion is significantly positive, perhaps reflecting fears 
of future inflation from an easier monetary policy.  Finally, the corporate bond spread 
does not seem to respond systematically to our set of indicators.
We then proceed to use the predicted values of the forecasting equations of Table 
2—and other explanatory variables—in dynamic equations for the EM spread.  These are 
reported in Table 3, where all the coefficients, except for the intercepts, are identical 
across countries.
The first column of Table 3 reports estimates of a model that includes only the 
residual from the first-stage regression (from Table 1) and the first differences of the 
long-run determinants.  In the notation of equation (8), the set of Y variables is identical 
to the X variables.  Notable in the results is that the lagged residual is strongly significant, 
consistent with an error correction model and implying that 10 percent of the deviation 
from the long-run relationship is closed each month.  The short-run dynamics are 
significantly affected by some of the same variables.  In particular, increases in both the 
US long rate and corporate spread tend to increase the EM spread, as does the country’s 
debt/gni ratio.  Conversely, increases in reserves and the proportion of debt that is short-22
term tend to lower the spread.  Columns 2 and 3 add forecast (one month ahead) US 
interest rate variables.  The forecast change in the hi-low spread and, in the parsimonious 
model (dropping variables with insignificant coefficients), also the forecast change in the 
US T Bill rate, tend to increase spreads.  Thus, movements in US economic activity and 
inflation have an indirect effect on EM spreads.
The Pooled Mean Group estimates tend to confirm the conclusions derived from 
the two-step procedure.  These results, presented in Table 4, impose the same long-run 
relationship but allow the short-run dynamics to differ across countries.  The common 
long-run coefficients are given in the upper part of the table.  As expected, they have the 
same signs as those in Table 1: the T Bill rate times debt has a positive (but insignificant) 
coefficient, the US 10-year rate a negative effect, greater trade openness and reserves 
reduce the spread, while higher debt increases it.  The error-correction term, as captured 
by the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, is almost everywhere significant with 
the right sign.  Its median value, around -.15, is somewhat higher in magnitude than that 
estimated in Table 3.  The short-run dynamic terms captured by coefficients on the ΔY
variables are too numerous to be reported; they are diverse but include many significant 
values, including on forecasted US rate variables.  The parsimonious model of the 
rightmost column of the table drops insignificant ΔY variables to get more efficient 
estimates.
V. Conclusions
Our results suggest that, in order to understand the effect of global monetary 
conditions and of an EM country’s own policies, we need to separate the sample of EM 
spreads into two, distinguishing crisis from non-crisis periods, and need to allow for non-23
linearity in the effect of US rates on EM spreads.  Our results confirm the differences 
between crisis and non-crisis periods, including differences of the effect of US rates, and 
confirm the existence of non-linearity.  Furthermore, variables capturing anticipation of 
US monetary policy changes have significant effects on EM spreads, in addition to the 
current values of US interest rate variables.
What is the prospect for EM spreads at present, in 2005 , in the light of expected
increases in US interest rates as the very expansionary monetary conditions are brought 
back to a more neutral position—and perhaps to a tightening stance should US inflation 
ratchet up?  Our framework for analysis suggests some tentative conclusions.  
It is useful to consider the question in two stages.  First, the level of interest rates 
in world capital markets—strongly influenced by US rates—will affect the solvency of 
EM borrowers.  However, if they have moderate levels of debt, their repayment prospects 
will remain good and there will be little increase in the probability of default, and hence 
little increase in spreads.  For countries that are close to the borderline of solvency, 
however, global interest rates can have a dramatic impact on the ability to repay, and 
could lead to a much steeper increase in their spreads. So the situation of each individual 
EM country is crucial to gauging the effect of US monetary tightening. As an illustration,   
Figure 4 displays the impact  a 200-basis-point increase in the U.S. T bill interest rate on 
emerging market spreads (using the long-run estimates of Table 1, and assuming no 
change in the long-term rate or corporate spreads): this translates into increases ranging 
from 6 basis points (for countries with debt-to-GNI ratios below 40 percent) to 64 basis 
points (for highly indebted countries with debt-to-GNI ratios above 90 percent). 24
Figure 4 Change in sovereign bond spreads from 200 
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Second, if the tightening of monetary conditions tips a country into a position of 
default, then it might provoke a more widespread shift towards reduced risk appetite by 
provoking a significant unwillingness of investors in EM debt to rollover existing debt or 
extend new debt—what Calvo calls a “sudden stop.”  This has occurred on at least half a 
dozen occasions over the past two decades, and would correspond in our model to a shift 
to a crisis equilibrium. While the causes of the crises are many, and there is no consensus 
that US monetary policy was even an important contributing factor in each of them, the 
debt crisis of August 1982 and Mexico’s devaluation of 1994 both followed a sharp 
tightening of US monetary policy, and attacks on Asian currencies in 1997-98 and strain 
on Argentina’s currency board in 2000-2002 came during a period of US dollar strength.  
Subsequent abandonment of US dollar pegs (de facto or de jure) has no doubt left these 
EM countries less vulnerable to currency crisis.
For a number of reasons it seems to us that the risk that US monetary tightening 
might lead to dramatic increases in EM spreads and in global risk appetite is much lower 25
than in those past periods mentioned above.  First, countries’ levels of indebtedness are 
generally lower, as a ratio to GDP, than they were in those earlier periods, as countries 
have learned the dangers of external borrowing, especially short term, and the level of 
foreign exchange reserves is also considerably higher.
18  However, countries are 
differentially affected by the current high level of commodity prices, some benefiting 
greatly through their commodity exports, while others may be mainly impacted by the 
higher value of their oil imports.
Second, the fact that monetary tightening is largely anticipated (which was not the 
case, for instance, in March 1994) is likely to lead to a less brutal adjustment of spreads 
and to permit EM countries to take palliative measures in the meantime, including 
lengthening maturities to lock in lower rates.  For those countries that still limit the 
fluctuations of their currencies against the US dollar, the fact that the dollar has 
weakened against the euro and yen gives more room for maneuver.
Finally, there is evidence that investors are much more able to discriminate 
among borrowers, and less likely to infer that problems in one country signal problems in 
others.
19  For instance, the default by Argentina in 2002—the largest default in history—
did not cause much disruption in world capital markets, nor did neighboring countries 
suffer major increases in their spreads.  Thus, should higher interest rates push a country 
to the edge of default, the likelihood of generalized contagion seems much lower.
                                                
18 Though aggregate figures are very much influenced by China, India, Korea, and a few other Asian 
countries.
19 Masson (2003) found that co-movement of EM spreads was lower in crises subsequent to the Asian 
crisis, indicating greater differentiation among countries.26
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Table 1. Long-Term Influences on Emerging Market Spreads, 
1991M1-2004M6
20
Coefficient values (absolute t-ratios)









long-term interest rate -.0192(0.94) .2261(1.18) -.0143(.74) ..
hi-low corporate spread .0739(9.08) .0601(0.57) .0794(10.0) .0796 (12.4)
(2) country specific 
variables
trade openness -.9260(24.2) -.0640(.08) -.918(23.6) -.913 (23.9)
debt/gni .0093(7.75) .0200(2.82) .0087(7.77) .0089 (8.09)
reserves/debt -.0212(15.9) -.0622(8.01) -.0194(16.0) -.0191 (16.0)
short-term/total debt -.0291(19.8) -.1055(4.37) -.0283(20.2) -.0280 (20.1)
(3) interaction variables
US Tbill rate times 
country’s debt/gni
.00066(3.21) .0011(0.69) .00084(4.31) .00081 (4.35)
contagion dummy .0115(1.20) -.2123(2.56) .0186(1.97) ..
constant 6.944(37.5) 7.213(6.36) 6.779(38.9) 6.707 (89.1)
(4) statistics
no. of obs. 1551 54 1497 1497
R2 .5785 .8243 .5976 .5960
p-value for zero coeffs .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
                                                
20 Period of estimation depends on the country’s data availability.  Static regression of the log of spreads on the explanatory variables listed above, with all 
coefficients constrained to be the same for all countries.29
Table 2. Forecasting Equations for First Differences in US Interest Rates
1992M5-2004M6




US Tbills 10-year Treasuries Corporate Hi-Lo 
Spread
Producer Price
Lag 1 2.400 (1.29) 4.438 (1.68) -4.359 (.76) 
Lag 2 2.308 (1.23) -2.677 (1.01) 4.176 (.73)
Lag 3 -2.716 (1.48) -4.973 (1.90) .356 (.06)
Retail Sales
Lag 1 2.751 (1.95)  6.266 (3.13) -9.099 (1.62)
Lag 2 5.643 (3.84) 6.826 (3.27) 1.745 (.39)
Lag 3 2.791 (1.99) 3.612 (1.81)  -2.408 (.56)
Capacity 
Utilization
Lag 1 10.124 (3.54) 5.524 (1.36) 4.291 (.49)
Lag 2 3.604 (1.24) .425 (.10) -3.769 (.42)
Lag 3 7.128 (2.38) .707 (.16) -11.098 (1.21)
M2
Lag 1 -3.081 (1.37) 8.563 (2.67)  -12.034 (1.74)
Lag 2 -2.082 (.96) -.547 (.18) -1.761 (.26)
Lag 3 -3.601 (1.57) 1.201 (.37) -3.812 (.54)
Constant -.0324 -.1303 .1163
No. of obs. 146 146 146
R2 .3418 .1796 .068
p-value .0000 .0000 .000030
Table 3. Dynamic Error Correction Models for Changes in Log Spreads: Fixed 
Effects, Non-crisis periods, 1991M1-2004M6
Coefficient values
21 (absolute t-ratios)
explanatory variables Actual US interest 
rate changes only
(1)
Actual and forecast 





(1) lagged residual from 
Column 4 of Table 1
-.1040 (9.33) -.1037 (9.12) -.1035 (9.13)
(2) changes in US Interest 
Rate Variables 
US T Bills  .0338 (1.66) .00092 (.04) ..
10 year Treasuries .0653 (3.41) .0674 (3.46) .0671 (3.66)
US hi-low corporate 
spread
.1274 (16.9) .1280 (16.6) .1288 (17.0)
Forecast US T Bills .. .0660 (1.36) .0735 (1.96)
Forecast 10yr Treasuries .. .0114 (.21) ..
Forecast US hi-low 
spread
.. .1619 (4.26) .1513 (4.92)
(3) changes in country 
specific variables
trade openness .1016 (.96) .0982 (.93) ..
debt/gni .00888 (2.49) .00894 (2.49) .00974 (2.74)
reserves/debt -.0219 (3.35) -.0220 (3.35) -.0237 (3.63)
short-term/total debt -.0281 (3.55) -.0302 (3.77) -.0304 (3.81)
(4) contagion dummy .00288 (.97) .00444 (1.47) ..
(5) statistics










p-value for zero 
coefficients
.0000 .0000 .0000
p-value for test all u(i)=0 .0009 .0033 .0038
                                                
21 Separate country intercepts are not reported.31
Table 4. Pooled-Mean-Group Dynamic Error Correction Models for Changes in 
Log Spreads: Fixed Effects, Non-crisis periods, 1991M1-2004M6
Coefficient values
22 (absolute t-ratios)
Explanatory variables Full model Parsimonious 
model
(1) Long-run coefficients
10-yr Treasury rate -.2301 (4.29) -.2058 (4.41)
US hi-low corporate 
spread
.00585 (.29) .00753 (.43)
US Tbill rate times 
country’s debt/gni
.000775 (1.80) .000562 (1.48)
trade openness -.4676 (1.84) -.5352 (2.27)
debt/gni .00471 (1.21) .00734 (2.08)
reserves/debt -.0221 (3.40) -.0225 (3.83)
short-term/total debt -.00628 (.77) -.00116 (.16)
(2) coefficient on lagged 
EM spread, by country:
Argentina -.0720 (2.08) -.0577 (2.03)
Brazil -.1312 (3.28) -.1301 (3.39)
Bulgaria -.1372 (3.00) -.1362 (3.04)
Colombia -.3232 (1.92) -.2851 (1.87)
Ecuador -.1286 (3.28) -.1315 (3.41)
Mexico -.1699 (2.96) -.1823 (3.10)
Morocco -.1601 (3.99) -.1547 (4.14)
Nigeria -.1393 (3.93) -.1188 (3.99)
Panama -.4963 (3.50) -.5228 (3.67)
Peru -.4452 (3.81) -.1420 (5.11)
Philippines -.1405 (2.50) -.1461 (2.91)
Poland -.1545 (2.64) -.1339 (2.70)
Russia -.1205 (2.74) -.1254 (2.97)
South Africa -.0191 (.39) -.0157 (.37)
Turkey -.3084 (1.47) -.3139 (1.98)
Ukraine -.3742 (1.76) -.3420 (2.04)
Venezuela -.1321 (3.20) -.1345 (3.39)
(3) statistics
no. of obs. 1443 1443
R2 .3294 .3194
Adjusted R2 .2458 .2703
p-value for zero 
coefficients
.0000 .0000
                                                
22 Coefficients on the explanatory variables in first-differences and separate constant terms, which are 
allowed to differ across countries, are not reported.32
Appendix: List of Variables
variable name definition source
EM spread Emerging Market Bond Index JP Morgan
debt/gni total debt /Gross National Income GDF, World Bank
short-term debt/total debt GDF, World Bank
tradeop (imports+exports of G&S)/GDP IFS, IMF
reserves/debt for. exchange reserves/total debt GDF, World Bank
US long-term interest rate government 10-year bond yield US BEA
US Tbill rate secondary market yield, 3-mo. treas. bill US BEA
US hi-low corp. spread Moody’s Baa-Aaa corp. bond yield US BEA
crisis dummy =1 if country in crisis, otherwise 0 Kaminsky (2003)
contagion dummy =n if n other countries are in crisis based on Kaminsky (2003)
US producer price index US BEA
US capacity utilization Industrial sector US BEA
US retail sales All sectors US BEA
US M2 Federal Res. Board